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I. INTRODUCTION
Generally, advertising tends to lower prices and stimulate competi-
tion.1 This unexceptional statement becomes controversial, however,
when applied to the legal profession. Indeed, only the newest members
* The views expressed are those of the Authors, not necessarily the Federal Trade
Commission, other Commissioners, or other Commission staff.
** Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission; B.A., University of New Mexico; J.D., Cornell
Law School; author, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW (1988).
*** Deputy Director for Economic Policy Analysis, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade
Commission; A.B., Georgetown University; Ph.D., Washington University in St. Louis.
**** Economic Research Analyst, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission; B.S.,
College of Charleston; M.A., Clemson University.
1. See, e.g., Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. EcON. 213 (1961). This theoret-
ical proposition has been confirmed by numerous empirical studies. See, e.g., J. CADY, RESTRICTED
ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION: THE CASE OF RETAIL DRUGS (1976); A. MAURIZi & T. KELLY, PRICES
AND CONSUMER INFORMATION: THE BENEFITS FROM POSTING RETAIL GASOLINE PRICES (1978); Ben-
ham & Benham, Regulating Through the Professions: A Perspective of Information Control, 18
J.L. & ECON. 421 (1975); Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. &
ECON. 337 (1972); Cady, An Estimate of the Price Effects of Restrictions on Drug Advertising, 14
ECON. INQUIRY 493 (1976).
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of the bar cannot recall the time when both professional and legal stric-
tures precluded attorneys from advertising. Attorney advertising has
been, and probably remains, a controversial subject. This Article ana-
lyzes attorney advertising and the regulations that police it.2 The Arti-
cle begins by discussing the legal history of restraints on advertising.
The Article then presents an economic analysis of the effects of attor-
ney advertising. Finally, the Article examines the empirical evidence
measuring the impact of attorney advertising on both the price and
quality of legal services. Based on this discussion, this Article recom-
mends further liberalization of restrictions constraining professional
advertising.
II. HISTORY OF ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL RESTRAINTS ON ATTORNEY
ADVERTISING
Over a century ago, the Alabama bar became the first state bar
association to adopt a code of ethical standards for attorney behavior.3
The Alabama Code is the foundation of the ethical precepts enforced
by state bars today, which are designed to uphold the dignity of the bar
and to protect consumers from questionable professional practices. The
promulgation of ethical codes was a significant change in the way attor-
neys regulated themselves. In the early English tradition attorneys did
not consider themselves as active participants in commerce but as pub-
lic servants in a learned profession. The dignity of the bar and the qual-
ity of legal services were monitored by tradition and social etiquette.
The adoption of the Alabama Code of Ethics in 1887 marked a water-
shed of change.4 In essence, the Alabama Code permitted attorneys to
provide useful information about legal services but did not allow attor-
neys to solicit particular clients. This distinction between information
for the general public and solicitation to attract individual clients would
2. This Article draws on the extensive work of the FTC, CLEVELAND REGIONAL OFFICE AND
BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, REPORT OF THE STAFF TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IMPROVING CON-
SUMER ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES: THE CASE FOR REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON TRUTHFUL ADVERTIS-
ING (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter Cleveland Report].
3. ALABAMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF ETHICS (1887), cited in C. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS 53-54 nn.20 & 21 (1986).
4. Attorney advertising has been commonplace throughout much of American legal history.
See generally Cleveland Study, supra note 2, at 20-26; see also Comment, Of Shibboleths, Sense
and Changing Tradition-Lawyer Advertising, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 644 (1978). For a discussion of
the advertising undertaken by a prominent member of the Tennessee Bar, who was later to serve
on the United States Circuit Court, United States Court of Appeals, and the United States Su-
preme Court, see Calvani, The Early Legal Career of Howell Jackson, 30 VAD. L. REV. 39 (1977).
See also Shaffer, supra 41 VAND. L. REV. 697, 703-09 (1988).
Canon 16 of the Alabama Code allowed attorney advertising in newspapers, but called for
restraint in the form and manner of presentation.5
5. ALABAMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF ETHICS Canon 16 (1887).
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end quickly. By the 1880s many state supreme courts were punishing
attorneys for advertising regardless of the medium.'
In 1908 the American Bar Association (ABA) published its Canons
of Professional Ethics. The thirty-two Canons adopted by the ABA
were very similar to the Alabama Code and eventually were adopted by
every state. Canon 27 contained one important modification of the Ala-
bama Code by providing that "solicitation of business by circulars or
advertisement, or by personal communications, or interviews, not war-
ranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. '7 Starting in 1922 the
ABA began to issue formal opinions interpreting the thirty-two Canons.
The first of these formal opinions dealt with attorney advertising and
stated in part: "Any conduct that tends to commercialize or bring 'bar-
gain counter' methods into the practice of law, lowers the profession in
public confidence and lessens its ability to render efficiently that high
character of service to which the members of the profession are
called."8 The ABA eventually amended Canon 27 to allow attorney list-
ings in telephone and legal directories. Many members of the legal com-
munity opposed even this small step towards the promotion of the legal
practice, and successfully prohibited "distinctive" listings in telephone
directories. 9
A. Early Judicial Response to Attorney Advertising
Until 1975, judicial decisions supported the states' right to prohibit
advertising by attorneys and other professionals. First, it was generally
assumed that bar associations were free to regulate attorney conduct
without violating the federal antitrust laws. Most observers assumed
that the profession of law, like that of medicine, was not subject to the
federal antitrust laws under the so-called "learned professions exemp-
tion." In 1975, however, the Supreme Court rejected restraints on com-
mercial practices by professionals in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.10
In Goldfarb the Court held that the Virginia State Bar Association,
which had permitted the use of minimum fee schedules for its mem-
bers, could be sued for violation of the Sherman Act's proscription
6. See, e.g., People ex rel. Maupin v. MacCabe, 18 Colo. 186, 188, 32 P. 280, 280 (1893)
(suggesting that "[t]he ethics of the legal profession forbid that an attorney should advertise his
talents or his skill as a shopkeeper advertises his wares").
7. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 27 (1908), quoted in AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION,
OPINIONS OF THE CoMmIrEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 74-75 (1967) [hereinafter OPINIONS].
8. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 1 (1924), quoted in
OPINIONS, supra note 7, at 230-31.
9. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 284 (1951), quoted in
OPINIONS, supra note 7, at 628.
10. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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against price fixing.1 For the first time the organized bar was subjected
to the strictures of the federal antitrust laws. If the bar could not com-
bine to restrict price competition, it seemed open to question whether it
could combine to restrict advertising.
Second, courts held that states could regulate attorney advertising,
as they would any other business activity, without violating the first
amendment.12 The courts reasoned that since self-promotion was eco-
nomically, rather than politically, motivated, the first amendment did
not apply. This distinction between political and commercial speech
was recognized by the Supreme Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen.13 In
Chrestensen local police restrained the petitioner from distributing
handbills that advertised a for-profit exhibit of a submarine. 4 The Su-
preme Court, on review, maintained that purely commercial speech con-
tained no informational value.' 5 Thus, the Court expressly held that
"purely commercial speech" was outside the scope of the first
amendment.
In the mid-1970s the Court modified the commercial speech doc-
trine by distinguishing "purely commercial speech" from constitution-
ally protected communications that conveyed information or rendered
an opinion. In 1975 the Court decided Bigelow v. Virginia,16 in which
the Court reversed the appellant's conviction for advertising out-of-
state abortion services. Bigelow involved an advertisement by The
Women's Pavilion, a New York organization, which announced counsel-
ing and information for women with unwanted pregnancies. The ad also
stated that abortions were legal in New York. The appellant was con-
victed of violating a Virginia ordinance that prohibited any publicizing
of encouragement to have an abortion. In upholding the conviction the
Virginia courts relied on Chrestensen and held that the first amend-
ment protection of free speech did not apply to commercial speech.' 7
The Supreme Court reversed, determining that the protected informa-
tional portions of the ad outweighed the unprotected commercial as-
pects of the advertisement. Therefore, the advertisement received
11. Id. at 791-92; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1974).
12. See Head v. New Mex. Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S.
608 (1935).
13. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
14. Id. at 52-54. The New York City Sanitary Code prohibited the distribution of commercial
advertising materials on the city streets, but allowed the distribution of handbills that concerned
political issues. When the police stopped the distribution of the handbills, one side of which was
pure commercial advertising and the other side of which was political, the lower court issued an
injunction allowing distribution. Id. at 53-54.
15. Id. at 54.
16. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
17. 213 Va. 191, 195, 191 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1972).
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limited first amendment protection because it was not purely commer-
cial speech, but "convey[ed] information of potential interest and value
to a diverse audience." ' With this decision the Court heralded a major
change in the legality of professional and state restrictions on profes-
sional advertising.19
In 1976 the Court formulated the modern commercial speech doc-
trine in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council.20 This case differed from Bigelow in that it involved
strictly commercial speech.21 At issue was a Virginia statute banning
drug price advertisements.22 In defense of the statute the Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy (Board) offered two justifications for the ban on
price advertisements. First, the Board argued that unrestricted price
competition would lead to a reduction in the number of practicing
pharmacists. The professional pharmacists would be driven out of busi-
ness because discount pharmacists could offer lower prices. 23 Second,
the Board argued that drug price information would reduce professional
respect for pharmacists and eliminate personalized attention for cus-
tomers. A third justification discussed by the Court, but not specifically
mentioned by the Board, involved "maintaining a high degree of profes-
sionalism on the part of licensed pharmacists.
'24
The Court's decision balanced these justifications with the consum-
ers' interest in the free-flow of commercial information.2 Because the
efficient allocation of resources, so important in our economy, is based
on the economic decisions of the public, the Court concluded that it is
necessary to insure that consumers receive the information they need to
18. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822.
19. Perhaps in response to this and other developments, the organized bar relaxed its prohi-
bition of attorney advertising. For example, the ABA House of Delegates amended its Model Code
of Professional Responsibility in February 1976 to permit the use of limited information in the
classified section of telephone directories. Newspaper and other media advertising were still pro-
hibited. Cleveland Report, supra note 2, at 32.
20. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
21. Justice Blackmun writing for the Court stated that the decision was not clouded by the
pharmacist offering political or cultural views, but simply "I will sell you the X prescription drug
at the Y price." Id. at 761.
22. The statute, Virginia Code Annotated § 54-524.35 (1974), stated in part: "Any pharma-
cist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who ... (3) publishes, advertises or pro-
motes, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium,
discount, rebate or credit terms for professional services or for drugs containing narcotics or for
any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 750 n.2 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974) (repealed by Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy)).
23. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 768.
24. Id. at 766.
25. Id. at 763. The Court explained that "[i]t is a matter of public interest that those deci-
sions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial
information is indispensable." Id. at 765.
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make informed economic decisions.26 Private interests also were in-
volved in this case. According to the Court, the groups most harmed by
the lack of prescription drug price information were the poor, the sick,
and the aged. These groups tend to spend more on health care relative
to the general public, and would benefit more from the price informa-
tion. The Court dismissed the justifications for the ban on drug price
advertisements as "highly paternalistic"2 and stated that "the advertis-
ing ban does not directly affect professional standards one way or the
other." '29 Moreover, the Board had made no claim that the advertising
ban would inhibit pharmacists from "cutting corners" and providing an
inferior service.30 In fact, the Court noted that the result of the adver-
tising ban could be "to insulate [the pharmacists] from price competi-
tion and to open the way for [the pharmacists] to make a substantial,
and perhaps even excessive, profit. . . ."' Thus, the Court ruled that
the benefits derived from the price information greatly outweighed the
state's interest in regulating pharmacists' professionalism.
B. The New Beginnings of Attorney Advertising
The Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy expressly limited
the new freedom to advertise to pharmacists. Advertising by other pro-
fessionals was reserved for a later decision.2 One year later in Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona the Court was faced with a direct challenge to
state restrictions on attorney advertising.3 In Bates two lawyers adver-
tised their legal services in violation of the disciplinary rules of the Ari-
zona Supreme Court.34 The facts of the case demonstrate the presence
of a new competitive force in the delivery of legal services. Bates and
his partner opened a "legal clinic" that specialized in routine legal ser-
26. Id. at 765.
27. Id. at 763.
28. Id. at 770.
29. Id. at 769.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. The Court stressed:
[W]e have considered in this case the regulation of commercial advertising by pharmacists.
Although we express no opinion as to other professions, the distinctions, historical and func-
tional, between professions, may require consideration of quite different factors. Physicians
and lawyers, for example, do not dispense standardized products; they render professional
services of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for
confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising.
Id. at 773 n.25 (emphasis in original).
33. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
34. DR 2-101(B), incorporated in Ariz. Sup. Ct. R. 29(A) (1956) (repealed Feb. 1, 1985) (cur-
rent version in ARIZONA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 42, ER 7.2 (codified as amended at
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A (Supp. 1987))).
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vices such as uncontested divorces, simple bankruptcies, and uncon-
tested adoptions. Bates and his partner refused to accept complicated
cases in order to keep down costs while fully utilizing paralegals, auto-
matic office equipment, and standardized legal forms. They set their
prices low and relied on volume to make a profit. After two years, Bates
and his partner determined that advertising was necessary to attract
the required volume of business. 5 The State Bar initiated disciplinary
proceedings, and the Arizona Supreme Court ultimately held that the
lawyers had violated the state disciplinary rules prohibiting attorney
advertising.3 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
In defense of the regulation prohibiting attorney advertising, the
Arizona Bar urged six justifications for the ban, each of which was re-
jected by the Supreme Court. First, the Arizona bar argued that price
advertising by lawyers would have an "adverse effect on professional-
ism." The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding the "postu-
lated connection between advertising and the erosion of true
professionalism to be severely strained." 8 The Court noted that clients
expect attorneys to charge for their services and that price information
might encourage some would-be clients to seek legal advice.39 Indeed,
the Court went so far as to suggest that, by not advertising, the bar may
be doing the public a disservice, rather than preserving
"professionalism. '40
Second, the Arizona Bar argued that advertising for legal services is
inherently misleading because legal services are individualized, because
the client often does not know in advance what he needs, and because
advertising alone cannot give a potential client all the information he
needs to make an informed decision. 41 The Court rejected each of these
arguments. The Court noted that routine services, such as those adver-
tised by Bates, are billed at a standard rate. The Court also found that,
while a client may not fully understand what is involved in a legal pro-
cedure, he can identify what he wants done.42 The Court also concluded
that consumers are aware of the limitations of advertising and that
price information is relevant to a consumer's decision. The Court rea-
35. Bates, 433 U.S. at 354.
36. In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976) (en banc), afl'd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Justice Holohan, dissenting, would have
found the state rule unconstitutional under the first amendment to the United States Constitution,
113 Ariz. at 402, 555 P.2d at 648 (Holohan, J., dissenting).
37. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 370.
40. Id. at 370-71.
41. Id. at 372.
42. Id. at 374.
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soned that advertising should not be prohibited simply because it is
incomplete; if such advertising is indeed misleading, the bar can require
that more information be disclosed.4"
Third, the Arizona Bar argued that attorney advertising would lead
to an increase in litigation, which would overburden already over-
crowded courts.44 The Supreme Court dismissed this argument by re-
fusing to "accept the notion that it is always better for a person to
suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action. '45 The Court
also indicated that attorney advertising is a natural, free-market re-
sponse to the problem of underutilization, since "the middle 70 % of our
population" do not receive adequate legal services, one of the reasons
for which is the fear of high legal fees.46
Fourth, the Arizona Bar argued that attorney advertising would in-
crease the cost of legal services and would allow established attorneys
to become so entrenched that younger attorneys would be unable to
enter the market place.47 The Court found this argument unsupport-
able. Relying on evidence of the effects of advertising on other profes-
sions, the Court concluded that advertising increases competition and
reduces prices.48 Because attorneys rely on reputation and community
contacts, the Court also reasoned that advertising can help establish an
attorney in a community, which would reduce rather than create barri-
ers to entry in the market place.49
Fifth, the Arizona Bar argued that attorney advertising would re-
duce the quality of legal services.5 0 The Court found this argument un-
convincing by reasoning that "[a]n attorney who is inclined to cut
quality will do so regardless of the rule on advertising." '51 The Court
suggested that the standardization of routine matters might even im-
prove the quality of legal work.
Finally, the Arizona Bar argued that a total ban on attorney adver-
tising was justified because the large number of lawyers and the lack of
sophistication of the typical client made enforcement of advertising
standards too difficult.5 2 The Court concluded that the traditional in-
tegrity of the bar, and the desire of members of the bar to weed out
those who have overstepped their trust, would provide adequate en-
43. Id. at 375.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 376.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 377.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 377-78.
50. Id. at 378.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 379.
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forcement of reasonable standards governing attorney advertising.53
Having found no economic or professional justification for the total
ban on attorney advertising, the Court held that the Arizona State
Bar's regulations prohibiting attorney advertising violated the first
amendment. Just as the Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
had concluded that restrictions on pharmacist advertising were not jus-
tifiable because of the substantial public interest in "the free flow of
commercial speech," the Court in Bates held that a total ban on attor-
ney advertising was unjustifiable. While the Court acknowledged that a
state could restrain false or misleading advertising, the Court concluded
that Arizona's prohibition of all attorney advertising was "overbroad.","
The Bates decision has prompted a virtual revolution in attorney
advertising.
While the Court has resolved the question concerning the legality
of attorney advertising, Bates left countless other issues unresolved.
5
The Bates Court did not rule out all limitations on attorney advertis-
ing.56 False, deceptive, or misleading advertising is subject to regulation,
and disclaimers may be necessary to prevent misleading the consumer.5
These unresolved issues have caused subsequent litigation.
A year after Bates, the Court considered whether state disciplinary
rules could prohibit solicitation of clients for political purposes. In In re
Primus5" an attorney advised a woman of her legal rights after she was
53. Id.
54. Id. at 382-84.
55. Antitrust challenges to restrictions on attorney advertising have encountered difficulty
when such restrictions are the creations of government rather than private action. Under the state
action exemption doctrine, conduct of the state as a sovereign enjoys antitrust immunity. See gen-
eraly Antitrust Law Developments, 2 A.B.A. SEc. ANTITRUST L. 605 (1984). These issues were
presented in Bates. Bates argued that the Arizona Supreme Court's disciplinary rules violated
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, because of their "tendency to limit competi-
tion." Bates, 433 U.S. at 356. In affirming the Arizona court's rejection of this argument, the Court
found that the regulation and the imposed discipline were, in reality, the actions of the state su-
preme court, which, as a co-equal branch of the state government, was the state itself. Accordingly,
the action complained of was that of the sovereign and thus entitled to state action immunity. The
Court distinguished the plaintiffs' reliance on Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975),
in which the Court concluded that the minimum price restrictions at issue were not protected by
the state action exemption since "it cannot fairly be said that the State of Virginia through its
Supreme Court Rules required the anticompetitive activities of either respondent [County and
State Bar associations]." 421 U.S. at 790. Thus, the conduct at issue was that of the professional
associations and not the state itself. Cf. Cantor v. Detroit Elec. Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). Further
analysis of this subject is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the doctrinal differ-
ences between first amendment and antitrust analysis of this issue, see Maute, Scrutinizing Law-
yer Advertising and Solicitation Rules Under Commercial Speech and Antitrust Doctrine, 13
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487 (1986).
56. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
57. Id. at 383-84.
58. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
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sterilized as a condition for receiving Medicaid, and informed her by
letter that the American Civil Liberties Union would represent her at
no cost.59 The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the attorney
violated the state's disciplinary rules barring client solicitation and im-
posed sanctions. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that this conduct should receive first amendment protection since it
was politically, rather than financially, motivated. 0
In the same term the Court decided Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar As-
sociation.1 In Ohralik the Court considered the question, expressly re-
served in Bates, whether a state can forbid the in-person solicitation of
clients for pecuniary gain. In a case that can only be described as classic
"ambulance chasing," the Court affirmed the judgment of the Ohio Su-
preme Court imposing disciplinary sanctions on an attorney for the in-
person solicitation of clients.62 In reaching its decision, the Court reaf-
firmed the state's role in maintaining standards among members of the
licensed professions, "[i]n addition to its general interest in protecting
consumers and regulating commercial transactions. 63 The Court noted
that the state's interest in regulating attorneys is particularly important
because of the lawyer's role in the administration of justice and as an
officer of the court.
6 4
59. Id. at 414-21.
60. Id. In reaching its decision the Court relied on NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), in
which the Court stated:
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private differ-
ences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all govern-
ment, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro community in this country. It is
thus a form of political expression. Groups which find themselves unable to achieve their
objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts. . . . And under the conditions of
modem government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to
petition for redress of grievances.
Id. at 429-30.
61. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
62. Id. In Ohralik an attorney solicited two teenage females involved in an automobile colli-
sion, both of whom were still recovering from their injuries. Id. at 449-50. The injured passenger
was a young women under the age of eighteen and still in high school. Id. at 449. Ohralik secured a
verbal agreement of representation with the passenger and a written representation agreement
with the driver, while she was still in the hospital in traction. Id. at 450-51. It was later disclosed
that Ohralik used a concealed tape machine to record his conversations with the driver's parents
and the passenger. Id. Both the driver and the passenger attempted to discharge Ohralik. Id. at
451-52. The passenger's mother attempted to discharge Ohralik from the case the very next day.
Id. In the attempt to revoke their agreements with Ohralik, both women filed complaints with the
grievance committee of the county bar. Id. The state bar filed formal charges against Ohralik with
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Id. at
452-53. Ohralik was successful in his claim for one-third of the driver's recovery, but his suit
against the injured passenger was dismissed with prejudice after the decision of the Ohio Supreme
Court.
63. Id. at 460.
64. Id.
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In In re R.M.J6 5 the Court considered a state's effort to regulate
the language and content of attorney advertisements. Following the
Bates decision, the Missouri Supreme Court had tried to strike a bal-
ance between the prohibition of attorney advertising and unlimited per-
missibility. Accordingly, Missouri permitted attorney advertising, but
restricted it to certain types of information and, in certain cases, pre-
scribed the language to be used. In re R.M.J. involved the disbarment
of an attorney who had advertised information that was not expressly
permitted under the Missouri regulations: that he was admitted to
practice before the United States Supreme Court and that he practiced
in areas of law which were described by language not permitted under
the regulations (such as "personal injury" rather than "tort law").
Moreover, in contravention of the state regulation, the attorney's adver-
tisements did not include the required disclaimer of expertise after list-
ing his areas of practice. The attorney also mailed cards announcing the
opening of his law office to persons other than former clients.6 7 In sub-
sequent disbarment proceedings, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the regulations at issue. 8 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court reaffirmed that truthful advertising enjoys first
amendment protection. According to the Court, states may prohibit
misleading advertising, but state regulations may be no broader than is
necessary to prevent deception. 9
Applying these principles, the Court found that the State's prohibi-
tion on the use of certain terms to describe areas of legal prac-
tice-"tort law" but not "personal injury"-did not serve a substantial
government purpose. Nor did the Court find that such language was
misleading. Accordingly, the restrictions on the specific language of at-
torney advertisements were impermissible.7 0 The Court then focused on
the allegation that the attorney had impermissibly mailed cards an-
nouncing the opening of his office to persons other than former clients.
The Court found nothing in the record that would support either a sub-
stantial government purpose to prohibit such mailings or a finding that
they were inherently misleading.71 Accordingly, the Court reversed the
Missouri judgment to disbar the attorney.
Most recently in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
72
65. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
66. Id. at 193.
67. Id. at 196-97.
68. Id. at 198.
69. Id. at 203.
70. Id. at 205.
71. Id, at 206.
72. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
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which involved the propriety of an attorney's advertisements, the Court
restated that attorney advertising was commercial speech and entitled
to the constitutional protection of the first amendment.73 According to
the Court, "Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does
not concern unlawful activities, however, may be restricted only in the
service of a substantial governmental interest, and only through means
that directly advance that interest.
7 4
In considering Zauderer's advertisements, the Court evaluated the
State's interest in the regulations that the advertisements apparently
had violated. First, the Court asked whether the advertisements "ran
afoul of the rules against self-recommendation and accepting employ-
ment resulting from unsolicited legal advice. 1 75 Finding that the adver-
tisements were not false or deceptive, the Court considered whether
prohibition of such representations "advances a substantial governmen-
tal interest." The Court could find none. 6 Second, the Court considered
the use of an illustration in one of Zauderer's advertisements. Although
it found "no suggestion that the illustration actually used by [Zauderer]
was undignified," the Court observed that "we are unsure that the
State's desire that attorneys maintain their dignity in their communica-
tions with the public is an interest substantial enough to justify
abridgement of their First Amendment rights. 77 .
Finally, the Court considered whether Zauderer's failure to inform
73. Zauderer had sought to augment his legal practice by newspaper advertising. One adver-
tisement represented that in drunken driving cases the "[flull legal fee [would be] refunded if [the
client was] convicted of DRUNK DRIVING." Id. at 629-30. When challenged by the attorney for the
appellee, Zauderer withdrew the advertisement, apologized, and volunteered to refuse to represent
those who had answered the ad. In a second advertisement Zauderer publicized his willingness to
represent women who had used the Dalkon Shield:
DID YOU USE THIS IUD? The Dalkon Shield Interuterine [sic] Device is alleged to have
caused serious pelvic infections resulting in hospitalizations, tubal damage. . . . It is also al-
leged to have caused unplanned pregnancies ending in abortions [and] miscarriages.. . . If
you or a friend have had a similar experience do not assume it is too late to take legal action
against the Shield's manufacturer. Our law firm is presently representing women on such
cases. The cases are handled on a contingent fee basis of the amount recovered. If there is no
recovery, no legal fees are owed by our clients.
Id. at 630-31. The advertisement concluded with the firm's telephone number and a note that the
reader might call for "free information." Id. at 631. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a
complaint charging Zauderer with violation of the state disciplinary regulations. Before a panel of
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Ohio Supreme Court, Zauderer
urged that the restrictions on the content of the advertising were unconstitutional. Both the panel
and the Board itself rejected Zauderer's arguments. The Ohio Supreme Court found that Zauderer
had violated the state regulations and that the regulations did not contravene the first amend-
ment. Id. at 631-36.
74. Id. at 638.
75. Id. at 639.
76. Id. at 641.
77. Id. at 647-48.
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clients that they "might be liable for significant litigation costs even if
their lawsuits were unsuccessful" was unlawful.7 8 The Court rejected
Zauderer's argument that the State must either establish that the ad-
vertisement was deceptive absent additional disclosure, or that the
State had a substantial governmental interest which would be furthered
and that no less drastic means was available to it. Rather, the Court
held that "an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as dis-
closure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in
preventing deception of consumers. 7 9 Accordingly, the Court found
that Zauderer's representation that there would be no attorney's fees
unless there was a recovery presented the possibility of deception.
Therefore, the Court concluded that "[t]he State's position that it is
deceptive to employ advertising that refers to contingent-fee arrange-
ments without mentioning the client's liability for costs is reasonable
enough to support a requirement that information regarding the client's
liability for costs be disclosed."' 0
The reaction of the organized bar to these cases concerning attor-
ney advertising also has been most noteworthy.81 Virtually every juris-
diction has revised its regulation of attorney advertising. There has
been a myriad of methods for addressing the specific questions involv-
ing attorney advertising.82 While important, these questions about the
application of general principles to specific cases are beyond the scope
of this Article. Instead, this Article now analyzes the possible effects of
attorney advertising and examines how attorney advertising has af-
78. Id. at 650.
79. Id. at 651.
80. Id. at 653.
81. For a description of the initial response of the ABA, its revisions of regulations in the
1980 Discussion Draft of the Rules of Professional Conduct circulated by the Kutak Commission,
and the reaction of state regulators, see Cleveland Report, supra note 2, at 34-54; Metzloff &
Smith, The Future of Attorney Advertising and the Interaction Between Marketing and Liabil-
ity, 37 MERCER L. REv. 599, 605-09 (1986).
82. The courts have decided other cases addressing specific questions on media choice and
mail solicitation by attorneys. In Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State
Bar Association v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1984), vacated, 472 U.S. 1004, nonacq. 377
N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1985) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986), the Supreme Court
vacated the Iowa Supreme Court's rule that prohibited background sound, visual displays, and
dramatized voices in electronic media presentations. However, the Iowa Court reaffirmed on re-
mand. In In re von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1007 (1985), the New York Court of Appeals found that mail solicitation enjoyed first
amendment protection, but could be regulated to some degree.
The Supreme Court has heard arguments in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 726 S.W.2d
299 (Ky. 1986), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 64 (1987), motion granted, 108 S. Ct. 690 (1988), which
presents the question of whether a state can prohibit an attorney from engaging in direct mail
solicitation. Relying on Zauderer, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the state rule was un-
constitutional, but adopted Model Rule 7.3, which still prohibits direct mail solicitation. Shapero
appealed, and the Supreme Court accepted certiorari.
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fected the delivery of legal services.
III. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF PROFESSIONAL ADVERTISING
A consumer's decision to consume legal services, like his or her de-
cision to make any other purchase, is based on the estimated trade-off
between the costs and the potential benefits provided by the service. In
general, economic theory predicts that the better informed a consumer,
the better the consumer can weigh the costs and the benefits of buying
any good or service. An informed consumer is in the best position to
choose from existing products or services, because he or she will reap
the rewards of a good choice or bear the costs of a bad one. In an un-
constrained market, this freedom of choice forces firms to communicate
the benefits of their service or product to consumers, and to compete to
provide the service that consumers want at the lowest feasible price.
3
Under certain circumstances, however, markets may not function as
smoothly as this simple economic model predicts.
Both opponents and supporters of attorney advertising agree that
the dissemination of truthful, nondeceptive information to consumers
will directly benefit consumers and enhance competition in the legal
market.8 4 The fundamental dispute is over how this information can be
distributed most efficiently, without reducing the quality of legal
services.
Opponents of attorney advertising believe that the legal profession
necessarily operates in a market of imperfect information which adver-
83. This economic efficiency analysis contrasts with the traditional approach to the law es-
poused by Professor Norman Bowie, supra 41 VAND. L. REv. 741, 741-55 (1988) which focuses on
the altruistic motivations of the law. Economic efficiency analysis, on the other hand, argues that
the law should provide the legal services that consumers demand. Empirical estimates reflect the
increased costs derived from the traditional approach. For example, the restrictions on lawyer ad-
vertising and other professional activities have the altruistic goal of ensuring equal justice and
fairness under the law. As the studies show, however, the economically efficient manner of provid-
ing goods and services enables more consumers to use the services regardless of the providers'
motivation, and to do this at significantly lower costs.
84. See Kallis & Vanier, Consumer Perceptions of Attorney and Legal Service Advertising:
A Managerial Approach to the Delivery of Legal Services, 14 AKRON Bus. & ECON. REv., Winter
1983, at 42, 46 (table 4) (indicating that consumers demand information on attorney expertise,
availability, location, and fees). Another study also shows the usefulness of factual information in
the attorney selection process. The top three selection criteria actually used by consumers who
reported past use of an attorney were personal acquaintance, recommendation by friend, and past
representation by the lawyer. When ranked by how important each should be when selecting an
attorney, these same criteria were listed considerably lower. Criteria that consumers considered
more important included integrity of the lawyer, quality of service, promptness of service, area of
lawyer specialty, past experience as a lawyer, and the costs of legal services. Smith & Meyer, Attor-
ney Advertising: A Consumer Perspective, 44 J. MARKETING, Spring 1980, at 56, 60 (table 1). Infor-
mation on legal costs and areas of specialty, and to a lesser degree other considerations, can be
advertised at least as reliably and truthfully as other methods of obtaining this information, and
may provide this information at a lower cost. Id. at 61-63.
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tising cannot correct. Consumers lack the information or expertise that
would enable them to judge the quality of the offered services, some-
times even after they have employed an attorney and the matter has
been resolved. In many cases it may be difficult to assess the quality of
services. For example, if an attorney settles a divorce case, the attor-
ney's client may not know if he or she received an equitable division of
property at the time the divorce is made final. In a torts case that is not
settled, the losing party may never know if he or she lost because of the
weakness of the case or because of incompetent representation by
counsel.
Opponents of attorney advertising also contend that attorneys may
be in a position to convince clients to bring nonmeritorious cases to
increase business, rather than to serve the interests of their clients. If
clients cannot distinguish between good and bad service, then there is
no reward for a firm to provide high quality service, and the quality of
service could drop below the level the clients want.s5 Some opponents of
attorney advertising claim that advertising will reduce the profession's
ability to serve the public. The commercialization of legal services will
reduce both the client's confidence in his attorney and the attorney's
own sense of dignity and self-worth.s6 In this way, clients presumably
would view all attorneys as providing low quality services, and good at-
torneys would not be rewarded for their superior service.
Finally, the opponents of attorney advertising predict that even
truthful and informative advertising could raise the price of legal ser-
vices.8 7 The theory states that prices could rise because advertising cre-
ates market power for established firms.""
In response to the claim that the legal profession necessarily oper-
ates in a world of imperfect information, the legal profession created
85. See S. YOUNG, THE RULE OF EXPERTS: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN AMERICA, (1987); Occu-
PATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION (S. Rottenberg ed. 1980).
86. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977) (summarizing the argument that
"[o]nce the client perceives that the lawyer is motivated by profit, his confidence that the attorney
is acting out of a commitment to the client's welfare is jeopardized").
87. Id. at 377.
88. See W. COMANOR & T. WILSON, ADVERTISING AND MARKET POWER (1974). However, more
recent analysis has questioned the usefulness of this theory. Comanor and Wilson, the same au-
thors who argued that advertising could increase market power and lead to increased profits
through higher prices, stated in a later article that
because the distribution of advertising intensities is highly skewed, there is no indication that
these effects [that high advertising can have substantial anticompetitive consequences] are
pervasive throughout the economy.. . .Rather, [higher profits] appear to be concentrated in
a small number of industries with high advertising-sales ratios and/or high absolute levels of
advertising per firm.




occupational licensing and other restrictions on lawyers, and assigned
the regulatory power to the state bars. State bars attempt to mold at-
torney behavior for the public good by scrutinizing and restricting pro-
fessional conduct, including the use of attorney advertising. However,
restricting attorney advertising is unlikely to correct the problems of
practicing law in a world of imperfect information and may even exac-
erbate these problems. Prior to Bates, information on price, quality,
and other factors necessary for a decision in the legal market were tra-
ditionally available only through the attorney's public reputation and
personal knowledge of the consumer. By adding advertising to the deci-
sion making process, economic analysis indicates that the flow of infor-
mation to consumers at a low cost will improve, and that this
information will not reduce the quality of legal services.
First, attorneys' costs fall when advertising is substituted for the
more expensive, traditional methods of attracting business. While ad-
vertising cannot replace a good reputation, advertising can provide use-
ful information to many consumers at once, which reduces the total cost
of providing legal services. 9 At least part of these cost reductions will
be passed on to consumers, as long as the legal profession is
competitive.
Second, absent advertising, some legal firms would find it difficult
to obtain the volume of business necessary to reduce the cost of provid-
ing routine legal services. Suppliers of routine legal services are "partic-
ularly strong in industries where firms can realize substantial economies
of scale by providing specific services at high volume."' 0 Advertising
may be necessary for such a firm to obtain sufficient volume in order to
reduce its costs and thereby lower its prices.
Third, advertising reduces consumers' search costs. Advertising
permits consumers to discover information about available services and
prices in less time and at less expense than if they had no choice but to
visit a number of attorneys to obtain the same information. Fourth, the
reduction in consumers' search time facilitates "comparison shopping,"
89. Specialization in the promotion and the production of legal services by use of marketing
and public relation firms can leave attorneys free for more productive legal activities. Past at-
tempts at specialization, the partnership form of organization, show the advantages of this tech-
nique. The partners concentrate on attracting new clients, while the associates produce the legal
services. One commentator notes:
In law firms, it is only the partners who participate in profit sharing. Associates typically are
paid a "straight salary" that is not a function of firm profits. Accession to partner status from
the associate ranks is to a large extent a function of existing partners' perception of an associ-
ate's ability to bring in business. ...
McChesney, Team Production, Monitoring, and Profit Sharing in Law Firms: An Alternative Hy-
pothesis, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 391 (1982).
90. Cleveland Report, supra note 2, at 82.
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which encourages competition in terms of the price and types of legal
services. Economic theory predicts that advertising will lower prices in
a market when "advertising is an efficient means of conveying informa-
tion.""1 The lower price is a result of the reduction of market power
that otherwise may be present when consumer search costs are high.92
Fifth, advertising also tends to lower prices by making entry easier for
new firms to gain recognition and challenge established firms. If new
firms are able to advertise, they will not have to rely on word of mouth
for consumers to learn about their presence in the market place. Thus,
new firms that can advertise will not be at a competitive disadvantage
during the period of market entry.93
Sixth, advertising may actually reduce consumer deception and im-
prove the ability of consumers to evaluate the quality of legal services.94
In particular, advertising can induce consumers to seek additional in-
formation about the lawyer through other sources, which reduces the
likelihood of consumers being deceived by advertising. Additionally, ad-
vertising may reduce the incentive for firms to run deceptive advertise-
ments. Because advertising encourages consumers to learn more about
the firm, attorneys who advertise realize that they will develop a nega-
tive reputation by making false or misleading claims.9 5 A negative repu-
91. Id. at 81.
92. See Stigler, supra note 1. On this point the Cleveland Report notes:
In markets where consumers are poorly informed about the distribution of price offers and
where search is costly, sellers tend to have some degree of monopolistic power. In such mar-
kets, lowering consumer search costs reduces the monopolistic power of individual firms and
tends to lower prices. Advertising that announces the presence or the price offer of the adver-
tising firm can serve as a means of lowering consumer search costs. Such advertising will, in
turn, tend to lower equilibrium prices in the market. If advertising is allowed, the individual
firm's incentive for using it is to increase the number of consumers who will be aware of the
firm's price offer. Other things equal, the firm's demand is higher when more consumers are
aware of its presence in the market and its price offer.
Cleveland Report, supra note 2, at 81 (footnotes omitted).
93. Cleveland Report, supra note 2, at 82.
94. See generally Grady, Regulating Information: Advertising Overview, in THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970: ECONOMIC REGULATION AND BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR 222 (K. Clark-
son & T. Muris eds. 1981); Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to Adver-
tise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1099 (1983) (suggesting that
"[a]dvertising tends to cause consumers to seek information about the producer's reputation and
about other consumers' direct experience with him").
95. McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme Court's Unanswered
Questions and Questionable Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 106 (1985) (suggesting that "sellers
who disappoint or deceive will not be the ones to advertise most"); see also Klein & Leffier, The
Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981). Accord-
ing to Klein and Leffler: "A sufficient investment in advertising implies that a firm will not engage
in short-run quality deception since the advertising indicates a nonsalvageable cost gap between
price and production costs, that is, the existence of a price premium." Id. at 630. The authors note
that consumers "know from past experience that when a particular type of investment [the price
premium] is present such as advertising they are much less likely to be deceived." Id. at 634.
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tation will deter consumers and the consumers' friends and families
from relying on future claims by the attorney. Thus, to the extent that
an attorney's future sales depend on his ability to maintain a reputation
for reliability, an attorney can be expected to exercise self-restraint in
his advertising claims, which reduces the need for the bar or other gov-
ernment bodies to regulate attorney claims.96
Seventh, the demand for legal services might increase as a result of
lower prices and services that are better tailored to the needs of con-
sumers of different incomes. Economic theory would usually view this
development as a sign of improved consumer welfare. Although there
may be valid reasons to limit the amount of litigation,97 reducing the
availability of legal services through advertising restrictions would be
an anticonsumer way to accomplish this objective.
Thus, these economic theories suggest that attorney advertising
will not only lower the price of legal services to consumers, but that it
may improve the quality of these services and better meet the needs of
clients. As in many areas of antitrust law," the Supreme Court has re-
lied on these economic theories in evaluating the proposed costs and
benefits of attorney advertising. Although the organized bar has argued
that consumers will be harmed by advertising, the Court has focused its
inquiries on claims of the decreased quality of legal services, the poten-
tially deceptive nature of legal advertising, and the possibility of in-
creased legal costs for the consumer if advertising were not restricted.
The Court has rejected these and other arguments as a basis for prohib-
iting attorney advertising.9 9 Overall, the Court has ruled that the bene-
fits of attorney advertising outweigh any countervailing cost
considerations. 100 Empirical evidence supports the Court's rulings on
these issues.
96. Reich, Preventing Deception in Commercial Speech, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 775, 794 (1979).
97. Since consumers may not bear the full cost of using the judicial system, there may be a
tendency to over consume legal services.
98. See Langenfeld & Scheffman, Evolution or Revolution-What is the Future of Anti-
trust?, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 287 (1986).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 37-53.
100. The Court has recognized the significance of advertising in creating a competitive envi-
ronment to ensure the consumer of the greatest available choice. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (noting advertising's "indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a free
enterprise system"). Without this allocative effect of advertising, legal professionals could amass
market power and create opportunities for excessive profits. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976).
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IV. EMPimICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF PROFESSIONAL
ADVERTISING
To determine whether attorney advertising benefits consumers, it is
desirable to examine whether lawyer advertising will lower the cost of
legal services without degrading the quality of these services. This sec-
tion begins by discussing evidence that assesses the impact of advertis-
ing on other professions. This section then discusses the more recent
studies of attorney advertising, all of which demonstrate that attorney
advertising benefits consumers.
A. Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Nonlegal Professional
Advertising
Similar to the development of the law, the studies measuring the
impact of advertising and the delivery of nonlegal professional services
antedates the subject of attorney advertising. In his study of prescrip-
tion drugs, John Cady found that the quality of service provided by
pharmacists was relatively consistent among states that did not regulate
pharmacist advertising as well as states that prohibited such advertis-
ing. 0 1 The study also concluded "that prescription drug prices are sig-
nificantly higher in regulated than in unregulated states."'1 2
Professor Lee Benham undertook two studies that measured the
impact of advertising on the price for ophthalmic goods and services. In
1972 Benham found that "[p1rices were . . substantially lower in
states which allowed advertising." 03 Advertising restrictions apparently
increased the price of eyeglasses by twenty-five percent to more than
one hundred percent. 04 In 1975 Benham evaluated the impact of three
levels of professional regulation on eyeglass prices. 0 5 Benham indexed
the price of eyeglasses to the following factors: The proportion of op-
tometrists in a state who were members of the American Optometric
101. J. CADY, RESTRICTED ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION: THE CASE OF RETAIL DRUGS (1976).
In a national survey of over 1900 pharmacies, Cady studied five measures of service including the
availability of home delivery, credit arrangements, emergency service, individual prescription
records, and waiting area. With the exception of prescription records, Cady found no evidence that
the pharmacists in states with advertising restrictions provided superior quality service to the
consumer.
102. Id. at 11. The results stem from a comparison of a sample of ten drugs across the states
that allow advertising and the states that did not. The ten drugs were picked to represent a sample
of all drugs dispensed in 1970. The difference in price was 5.2% or $3.83 in regulated states com-
pared to $3.64 in unregulated states. This difference is statistically significant at the one percent
level.
103. Benham, supra note 1, at 352. The price differentials were estimated from data col-
lected in a 1963 nation-wide survey on medical expenditures.
104. Id. at 344.
105. Benham & Benham, supra note 1.
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Association (AOA); states that were classified as "restrictive," "nonre-
strictive," and "other" by a survey of national eyeglass chains; and the
proportion of eyeglasses bought from commercial sources in a state. All
three indexes showed a strong association with the estimated price paid
for eyeglasses. 1°8 In general, the mean price paid for eyeglasses fell as
the proportion of AOA membership fell.107 Benham suggests that these
results are strongly correlated to the AOA restrictions on advertising
eyeglass prices.108 Others have published similar findings that confirm
the relationship between price and advertising restrictions.09
A 1980 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) report empirically tested
the effects of advertising on the price and the quality of optometric ser-
vice.110 The report found that "[t]he existence of advertising and com-
mercial practice by some optometrists in a market does not result in a
lowering of the quality of examinations available to consumers." '111 Fur-
ther evidence reported in the optometry study suggests that optome-
trists in cities where advertising was allowed were less likely to
prescribe unnecessarily new eyeglasses than optometrists in cities that
restricted advertising.'12 Moreover, the price for the combined optomet-
ric services of eye examination and glasses was almost twenty-one dol-
lars less in the least restrictive cities than in the most restrictive,
106. Id. at 434 (table 2), 435.
107. According to Benham,
When states with a rate of AOA membership greater than .7 are compared with those with a
rate of less than .5, the mean price differs by $10.53; it is 40 per cent higher in the former.
The price difference between states classified as restrictive and those classified as nonrestric-
tive is $9.27, 33 per cent higher in the restrictive states. Similar results hold for the categories
of states with proportion of eyeglasses obtained from commercial firms less than .25 or greater
than .50. In this case, the price differs by $7.16 and is 25 percent higher in the former. In all
three cases individuals living in states with a high level of professional control pay substan-
tially higher prices.
Id. at 438-40.
108. Although the AOA Rules of Practice adopted in 1950 contain 14 separate rules, all of
the rules cover only two major themes: "(1) the professional man obtains his clients by means
other than advertising, and (2) the professional man emphasizes service rather than merchandise."
M. HIRSCH & R. WICK, THE OPTOMETRIC PROFESSION 172 (1968).
109. See A. MAuRzI & T. KELLY, supra note 1. Feldman & Begun, Does Advertising of Prices
Reduce the Mean and Variance of Prices?, 18 ECON. INQUIRY 487 (1980).
110. R. BOND, J. KwoKA, J. PHELAN & I. WHITTEN, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, REPORT OF THE
STAFF TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, EFFECTS OF RESTRICTIONS ON ADVERTISING AND COMMER-
CIAL PRACTICE IN THE PROFESSIONS: THE CASE OF OPTOMETRY (Sept. 1980).
111. Id. at 26. The report based its findings on detailed measurements of optometric services
including the thoroughness of the eye examination, the accuracy of the prescription, the accuracy
and the workmanship of the resulting eyeglasses, and the extent of unnecessary prescribing. All
measurements of service quality in restrictive and nonrestrictive cities suggest that "consumers
who purchase an eye examination only to get the correct prescription and an accurate pair of
eyeglasses may safely shop on the basis of price." Id. at 23.




Evidence from the health professions also suggests that fears of de-
ceptive advertising may be overblown. A survey of state regulatory
agencies reported in a national symposium sponsored by the FTC found
"little evidence of fraudulent or misleading advertising. In fact, one
state attorney said 'the majority of complaints that we have about pro-
fessional advertising are from other professionals. We have practically
no consumer complaints about professional advertising.' "1
In summation, empirical evidence from studies of nonlegal profes-
sions shows that banning professional advertising of price and non-price
information has not benefited consumers and may, in fact, have harmed
consumers.
B. Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Attorney Advertising
Many empirical studies have tested the impact of advertising for
routine professional services on consumers. These studies attempted to
measure the benefits and the costs associated with the liberalization of
restrictions on attorney advertising. The studies hypothesized the ef-
fects of attorney advertising on quality, deception, and price. The evi-
dence from these studies demonstrates that the Supreme Court's
decision to allow attorney advertising does in fact increase consumer
welfare.
One such study by Timothy Muris and Fred McChesney provides
both subjective and objective evidence that refutes "the proposition
that firms relying on advertising to charge lower prices will necessarily
produce lower-quality services.""' Based on their study, Muris and
McChesney argue that advertising permits lower production costs for
legal clinics, which reduces prices without a corresponding reduction in
quality. The authors believe that advertising allows attorneys to lower
production costs by specializing in legal, rather that promotional, work.
In addition, the authors believe that advertising enables clinics to in-
crease sales volume, relative to traditional firms, by informing consum-
ers of lower prices and the services that are available.
Their study was composed of two parts. First, a survey compared
the quality of services rendered by legal clinics to those rendered by
traditional firms. This survey, conducted in the Los Angeles area, asked
consumers to rank subjectively seven aspects of the legal services they
113. Id. at 25.
114. Braun & Braun, Advertising Health Care Professionals: Problems, Solutions and Bene-
fits, in ADVERTISING BY HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS IN THE 80's: PROCEEDINGS OF A NATIONAL SYM-
POSIUM SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 87 (Dec. 1985).
115. McChesney & Muris, The Effect of Advertising on the Quality of Legal Services, 65
A.B.A. J. 1503, 1506 (1979).
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received.116 In all seven categories the legal clinics, which use advertis-
ing to attract many consumers with similar legal needs, recorded qual-
ity ratings superior to those of the traditional firms for services
provided.
Second, Muris and McChesney compared the representation skills
of attorneys in legal clinics and traditional firms for cases involving di-
vorce and child support payments. Divorce cases were used for this
study because the outcome-the size of the support payment-is based
on a standard formula using financial data supplied by the parties.
Holding the financial data constant, the authors measured the skill of
the attorney in representing his client.117 The results suggest that the
quality of representation by legal clinics is superior to that of tradi-
tional firms in obtaining favorable child support payments. When the
mother, who had custody of the child, was represented by the clinic, the
child support award was forty dollars higher, holding all other variables
constant. Inversely, when the father, who had to make child support
payments, was represented by the legal clinic, the child support award
was fifteen dollars lower. The authors concluded that "when advertising
leads to lower prices, it need not result in a loss of quality. Indeed,.
quality may even increase.
' '" 8
A survey taken in Florida three years after the Bates decision pro-
vides indirect evidence that attorney advertising generally is not decep-
tive. The survey found no evidence which linked legal firms that
advertised with malpractice claims." 9 From February of 1979 to Janu-
ary of 1981, when the results of the survey were published, no malprac-
tice claims filed in the state involved advertising lawyers. Florida had
approximately 25,000 attorneys and about 300 malpractice claims filed
annually. The survey results stated that "[e]arly indications are that
whether a lawyer advertises isn't a factor in predicting the likelihood of
116. The respondents were all past consumers of legal services. The categories of services
provided by traditional firms and legal clinics that were compared included: promptness in taking
care of matters, interest and concern about the client's problem, honesty in dealing with the client,
explaining matters fully to the client, keeping the client informed of progress, paying attention to
what the client had to say, and being fair and reasonable in charging for his service. Id. at 1505
(table 1).
117. A regression model was developed to estimate the amount of child support awards. The
independent variables used included the incomes and expenses of both parties, the number of
children involved, and the type of legal representation. The model reported that as a father's in-
come rises relative to the wife's, the award will increase. Expenses of the mother show a positive
relationship with the size of the award. Expenses of the father reduce the size of the award. The
number of children increases the award, but not at a constant amount. For example, the second
child does not double the award. Id. at 1505-06.
118. Id. at 1506.
119. Slonim, Survey: Ads Not Drawing Malpractice Claims, 67 A.B.A. J. 25 (1981). The sur-
vey was conducted by the Florida State Bar's professional liability insurance carrier.
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a malpractice claim.' 120
The most comprehensive study on attorney advertising is the Fed-
eral Trade Commission's report on lawyer advertising, which was con-
ceived by Professor Steven Cox in a 1978 pilot study. Cox sought to
investigate price differences between those attorneys who advertised
and those who did not. Cox concluded that on average those attorneys
who advertised charged lower prices than those who did not.' 21 Subse-
quently, the FTC, with the assistance and cooperation of Professor Cox,
conducted a more comprehensive study.
122
The studies sought to measure the relationship between the price
of legal services and the regulation of the legal profession. The Commis-
sion staff concluded on the basis of their investigation that restrictions
on attorney advertising raised the price of routine legal services. Ac-
cording to the FTC study:
Attorneys in the more restrictive states, on the average, charged higher prices for
most simple legal services than those in the less restrictive states. The fact that
stronger restrictions on advertising are associated with higher prices suggests that,
120. Id. at 25.
121. See Cox, DeSerpa & Canby, Consumer Information and the Pricing of Legal Services,
30 J. INDus. EcoN. 305 (1982) (published discussion of the major findings of the Phoenix Pilot
Study).
122. The Commission staff and Professor Cox each undertook separate surveys, although
both were designed by Cox. The first survey was conducted for Cox, with a grant from the Na-
tional Science Foundation, by the Survey Research Laboratory at Arizona State University and
included the cities of Birmingham, Alabama; Phoenix, Arizona; Fresno, California; Indianapolis,
Indiana; Jackson, Mississippi; and Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The second survey was conducted for
the FTC by Louis Harris & Associates and examined 11 cities: Hartford, Connecticut; Wichita,
Kansas; Baltimore, Maryland; Boston, Massachusetts; Detroit, Michigan; Springfield, Missouri; Al-
buquerque, New Mexico; Columbus, Ohio; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Nashville, Tennessee; and
Seattle, Washington.
Two hundred and fifty attorneys were interviewed in each city with reference to fees charged
for the following services: a simple reciprocal will for a married couple with two children; a recipro-
cal will with a trust provision to take effect if both parents died within a short time of one another;
an uncontested nonbusiness bankruptcy for a husband and wife; an uncontested dissolution of
marriage when there are no children and the property settlement has been agreed upon; and an
automobile accident when the driver of the other car has admitted responsibility and there is no
permanent pain, disability, or lost earnings capacity. For each of these services, the attorneys were
asked their flat fee (if one was applicable), their hourly rate, and the approximate number of hours
it would take to complete the service. They were also asked how many clients had been billed for
the same service during the past 90 days. In the context of the personal injury action, attorneys
were asked the contingency fee charged if settled before trial and the fee charged following trial.
See Cleveland Report, supra note 2, at 84-85. Attorneys were also questioned about their own
advertising practices.
Estimating the restrictiveness of state regulations on the advertising issue obviously required
greater discretion. Using the state regulation in effect at the time of the survey, states were classi-
fied as liberal, moderate, or restrictive on the advertising issue. For a more detailed explanation,
see id. at 88. The researchers then included in their analysis numerous factors (e.g. number of
divorces, age of population) designed to insure that they were measuring similar populations in
terms of their demand for legal services, etc. Data were adjusted to reflect the cost of living.
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in this type of market, the dominant effect of advertising is to enhance price com-
petition by lowering consumer search costs."
s"
The study also indicated that greater flexibility to advertise would re-
sult in lower prices for legal services. The study noted that "as restric-
tions are removed, more attorneys use advertising.. . . [A]s advertising
increases in the legal services market, prices will decline. . . . The data
show that attorneys who advertise a specific service tend to provide
that service at a lower price than attorneys who do not advertise that
service. ' 124 Table One summarizes the findings of the FTC study. It
shows that prices for basic legal services are more expensive in cities
with moderate and restrictive state rules on attorney advertising as
compared to cities with liberal rules on attorney advertising.
123. Id. at 79.
124. Id. at 126-27.
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Table 1
A Comparison of Service Prices Between Cities with Liberal,
Moderate, and Restrictive Attorney Advertising Regulations
Comparing Liberala Cities With:
Increased Prices for: Moderateb Restrictivec
Personal Injury
Contingent Fee 1.5% 4.5%
d
Bankruptcy $32 $44
Uncontested Divorce - $33
Simple Reciprocal Will $7
Simple Reciprocal Will
With Trust $26
Source: Cleveland Report, supra note 2, at 113-117 (tables G-K).
a The states' code followed the former ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility -
Proposal B, which basically established a "false and misleading" standard for lawyer advertis-
ing. Broadcast media advertising was allowed. The use of either direct-mail advertising or
trade names, or both was allowed.
b The states' code generally followed the content restrictions of ABA Proposal "A". Both
radio and television advertising were permitted. Trade names were prohibited, although the
use of the term "legal clinic" in conjunction with the firm name was specifically allowed in
some cases. Use of direct-mail advertising was prohibited.
c The states' code restricted advertising content to specified information. All broadcast me-
dia were prohibited. Direct-mail and trade names were prohibited.
d Percentage point increases.
Additional effects on price caused by attorney advertising are seen
by comparing the fees advertising attorneys charge for specific services
and the average price of those services in all cities. 12 5 The results are
shown in Table 2.
125. The average price is a weighted average of the price charged by attorneys in all cities for
services billed in a 90 day period for a particular service. According to the study, "This analysis
may more closely approximate the real average price paid by consumers, since it gives more weight
to the prices quoted by those attorneys who provide more of the specific services." Id. at 123.
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Table 2
Comparison of Attorneys that Advertise





Attorney Is: Will Bankruptcy Divorce Injury
Less expensive 2 2 5 0
More expensive 0 1 0 3
Source: Cleveland Report, supra note 2, at 124 (table P).
a The number of cities are less than the 17 studied since some comparisons were not statisti-
cally significant.
In all cases, except personal injury, attorneys who advertised a specific
service tended to charge less than either attorneys who did not adver-
tise at all or attorneys who did not advertise the specific service."' 6
The results for personal injury cases show the reverse effect, but
this result may be explained by careful examination of the data. On
average, personal injury cases are less expensive in cities where adver-
tising is allowed than in cities that restrict advertising, despite the fact
that attorneys who advertise in those cities charge higher prices than
those who do not. It would seem that the existence of advertising may
lower prices, even if particular firms that advertise can charge relatively
higher prices. The study concludes: "The empirical data, therefore, sup-
port the information theory of advertising and establish strong evidence
for relaxing unnecessary restrictions on truthful, non-deceptive adver-
tising practices.'1
27
In sum, empirical studies assessing the impact of attorney advertis-
ing on the legal profession find that advertising lowers the price of legal
services to consumers, without lowering the quality of those services.
This evidence supports the view that attorney advertising enhances
competition and reduces consumer search costs, without necessarily
leading to consumer deception or increasing the cost of providing legal
services.
126. Id. at 125. The price differences suggested by the results are not insignificant. An attor-
ney that advertised fees for a simple will charged about $25 less on average than an attorney who
did not advertise the specific service. For divorces the difference was approximately $185.
127. Id. at 127.
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V. THE FUTURE OF ATTORNEY ADVERTISING AND THE ROLE OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
Given the powerful arguments in favor of attorney advertising, the
existing evidence on the effects of attorney advertising, and the devel-
opment of favorable case law, we believe the move to permit more at-
torney advertising is desirable and inevitable. Although many of the
rules may be state sanctioned, the Federal Trade Commission has
played, and will continue to play, a major role in advocating fewer re-
strictions on attorney advertising.
Professionally and governmentally imposed restrictions on the abil-
ity of lawyers to engage in "commercial practices" is a subject of con-
cern to both the antitrust 28 and consumer protection 129 mandates of
the FTC. Such restrictions affect the former because they impede com-
petition, and the latter because the main danger of attorney advertising
is the potential for deceptive advertising-a focal point of the FTC's
consumer protection mission. Accordingly, the Commission has taken a
keen interest in professional and government imposed restrictions on
the ability of professionals, including lawyers, to practice their
professions.
The Commission staff has submitted many comments supporting
changes in professional conduct rules and state laws that would allow
more nondeceptive attorney advertising.'30 The Commission has urged
128. The FTC shares jurisdiction with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice in
the enforcement of the antitrust laws. With the exception of criminal enforcement, which is the
sole prerogative of the Justice Department, the FTC has concurrent jurisdiction in the discharge of
this responsibility. Both agencies have jurisdiction to enforce the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12
(1982). While technically only the Justice Department has jurisdiction to enforce the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982), has been
interpreted to include all of the proscriptions of the other antitrust laws. See FTC v. Cement Inst.,
333 U.S. 683 (1948). Thus, the Commission has jurisdiction to enforce both the provisions of the
Clayton and Sherman Acts. Indeed, the courts have construed the Federal Trade Commission Act
to reach conduct that is not proscribed by its sister antitrust laws, reasoning that the Commission's
expertise enables it to reach conduct, which while harmful, is not contemplated by the other stat-
utes. See generally Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competition" in Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C.L. REV. 227 (1980). But cf. In re General Motors Corp., 103
F.T.C. 641 (1984).
129. The FTC is empowered under section 5 of the FTC Act and numerous other statutes to
"eliminate unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, with emphasis on those
practices that may unreasonably restrict or inhibit the free exercise of consumer choice." Federal
Trade Commission 1985 Annual Report, transmitted to Congress on May 8, 1987. Similar to the
antitrust statutes the wording of the FTC Act allows great latitude in bringing actions in situations
in which competition is restrained.
130. In its continuing program of advocating the consumers' interest in promoting a competi-
tive marketplace, the Commission has submitted comments and information to many regulatory
agencies on the local, state, and national levels. The FTC has become a reliable representative of
consumer interests in regulatory matters, and many state bars have requested comments on the
consumer welfare implications of proposed revisions of their Rules of Professional Conduct. A par-
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that these prohibitions be reduced or eliminated. In particular, the
stated goal of the Commission is to identify and encourage removal of
restrictions that impede competition, increase costs, and harm consum-
ers without providing any countervailing benefits. We believe that the
FTC has played an important role in raising public awareness of the
benefits of attorney advertising, which has significantly benefitted the
consumers of legal services. In the future, we hope that state bars and
the FTC can work together to reduce unnecessary restrictions on pro-
motional activities of attorneys.
One particularly important opportunity for cooperation involves
the recent convocation of a Board of Advisors to draft the Restatement
of the Law, The Law Governing Lawyers, by the American Law Insti-
tute.""' This Restatement of the Law presents an important opportu-
nity to influence the development of the professional discipline of
attorney-client relationships. Both proposed Chapters II and IV deal
with the legal regulation of the legal profession and client-lawyer con-
tracts for legal services, respectively, and will presumably address the
important issue of attorney advertising. Given the influence of extant
Restatements on the development of law, it is important that the or-
ganized bar, consumer interest groups, and agencies like the Federal
Trade Commission ensure consumer interests are given paramount im-
portance in any such document.
tial list of states that requested comments from the FTC includes: Alabama, California, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Seattle, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
131. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERS (Prelim. Draft No. 1, Sept. 18, 1986).
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